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[n this paper, we develop a dynamic principal-agent model and analyze how a manager's concern about his reputation and the horizon of the relationship between a principal and manager affect the allocation of authority and the design of compensation. [n our framework, a manager has potentially better information than the principal about the firm's best course of action. To benefit from this information, the principal must grant the manager some decision-making authority. Like Holmstrom (1984) , we model authority as the freedom to choose from a certain set of actions; expanding the set of actions allows the manager to use his information more efficiently, but is costly since the manager can engage in opportunistic behavior. The key difference between our model and the existing literature is that we allow for both explicit incentives (compensation contracts) and implicit incentives (concerns about future career opportunities ).1
[n order to isolate the effects that are relevant for our analysis of the dynamic problem we start by analyzing a static setting. We find that the optimal level of discretion is determined by balancing the value of the manager's information against the cost of the explicit incentives required to ensure that the manager uses his authority productively. Whenever the manager has an informational advantage over the principal, the principal grants him authority and provides explicit incentives.
The primary focus of our analysis is on how dynamic considerations impact either the benefit or the cost side of this tradeoff between utilizing the manager's superior information and limiting the cost of compensation. The quality of the manager and his ability to generate useful information is uncertain, introducing a role for reputational concerns. We find that these concerns always make managers less inclined to abuse their discretion and pursue private benefits. Career concerns thus lower the explicit compensation necessary to discourage opportunism. However, we also find that career concerns can lead managers to ignore their private information (the very reason for granting them authority) and avoid taking actions that place their reputation at risk. [n such a scenario, it is optimal for a principal to both limit a manager's discretion (centralize decision-making) and to increase the reward for taking risks.
An important result from our analysis is that whether career concerns decrease the incentives of managers to use their authority productively depends on the returns to building a better reputation. When the potential gain in reputational capital from taking risks is high relative to the potential loss (i.e., when a manager's future compensation is convex in his perceived talent), managers have an incentive to act on their private information to distinguish themselves as superior decision-makers. In thi s case, career concerns lower the amount of explicit incentive compensation necessary to induce managers to use their discretion productively; the principal takes advantage of the improved alignment by granting managers greater authority than in the case without career concerns. On the other hand, if managers primarily fear damaging their reputations, such as when poor performance vastly diminishes their labor market opportunities, they avoid making decisions that are informative about their ability and choose conservative courses of action. [n this circumstance, it is costly to induce managers to use their authority productively.2 A principal preempts a manager's tendency to act conservatively by both providing stronger incentives and further centralizing decision-making. Hence it is a unique implication of our analysis that implicit incentives substitute for the explicit incentives necessary to discourage obvious forms of opportunism, but may simultaneously force a principal to use stronger explicit incentives to encourage managers to act on their knowledge and take risks. For example, in the context of asset management, our theory suggests that a senior portfolio manager will counter the tendency of a junior portfolio manager to closely track his benchmark index and avoid risks by either closely supervising investment decisions or providing greater rewards for outperformance; i.e., managerial conservatism manifests itself not only directly through managerial behavior, but also indirectly through costly adaptations by organizations.
[n much of our analysis, we assume that the principal has only a short-term relationship with a manager. [n long-term relationships an important additional consideration arises, which unambiguously increases a manager's level of authority. The success or failure of a project is revealing about a manager's ability only to the extent that the manager has decisionmaking authority. [n the extreme case, if an employee is simply told which action to take by a superior, there is little basis for evaluating the employee's capabilities. Consequently, discretion has informational benefits and allows future employers and lenders to learn about the ability of managers. When the principal expects to have an extended relationship with the manager, she internalizes this information externality, and increases the manager's level of discretion at the outset of the relationship.
The next section introduces the baseline model, which illustrates the basic tradeoffs, and links discretion to reputation, the value of information, and conflicts of interest in a static setting. Section 3 extends the model to a two-period setting and analyzes the role of career concerns. While in Section 3 we assume that the relationship between any principal and any manager lasts only one period, Section 4 analyzes the consequences of extending the relationship to both periods. Finally, Section 5 relates our analysis to the literature and Section 6 concludes. The Appendix contains all proofs.
The static model
To analyze the tradeoff between retaining control and granting greater discretion, we construct a model in which a principal (she) and a manager (he) enter into a contractual relationship and undertake a proj ect. The manager has potentially better information abou t the optimal course of action, and the principal can benefit from this information only by giving the manager discretion over the project. However, two factors make discretion costly: (i) uncertainty about the manager's talent and (ii) conflicts of interest. Here, we describe the informational structure, incongruity between the principal's and agent's preferences, and contracting environment, and solve the basic model to set the stage for the dynamic analysis in the subsequent sections.
Information, projects, and payoffs
To capture the manager's superior information, we assume that the manager privately receives a signal s about the state of world w. w is drawn from a distribution F(w) with support [0,1] and a strictly positive density,j(w). There are two types of managers: informed (high types) and uninformed (low types). s = w for an informed manager, while s is an independent draw from F ( . ) for an uninformed manager. In other words, the manager is either perfectly informed or completely uninformed . Neither the principal nor the manager know the manager's type. Intuitively, imagine a novice manager who does not yet know whether or not he is good at his job and hence has in this respect no informational advantage over his employer. Only over time his true ability is revealed. The assumption is important because it rules out ex ante asymmetric information between the two parties, which could potentially be mitigated by screening mechanisms (see footnote 3). The probability that the manager is informed is (j and is common knowledge. We identify the manager's reputation with beliefs about his type, which in the static model is fixed at the prior H.
There is a continuum of possible actions a E [0, 1]. The profitability 7r of action a depends on the state ofthe world, and it is 1 if a = wand zero otherwise. Therefore, an informed manager can generate a profit of 1 by choosing an action equal to his observed signal, while an uninformed manager generates an expected profit ofO. This 0-1 setup does not drive the results, but simplifies the analysis as follows : (i) it simplifies the principal's inference problem as low types cannot get lucky and generate high profit and (ii) it reduces the complexity of the set of monetary contracts as the realized profit is a simple discrete variable.
In addition to a E [0, 1], there is an action a, which maintains the status quo and yields a profit of R. independent of the state of the word. We refer to a as the "standard action". A crucial feature of the standard action, especially relevant in a dynamic context, is that the manager can avoid inferences about his ability by taking this action. For example, each value of a might represent a possible acquisition, the size of which is increasing in a. In this case, the action a corresponds to not acquiring any firm at all, and w is the optimal acquisition. So choosing a is equivalent to following a conservative course of action that does not require particularly outstanding abilities and is hence not informative with respect to the manager's talent. 3 When the manager acts on his information he generates a profit of 1 with probability e, i.e. the probability that his signal accurately reflects the state of the world. A benchmark profit of R can be generated without any information by simply always taking the standard action. Hence e -R represents the expected value of the manager's information. To make the problem interesting we assume that () > R as the reason for giving the manager discretion is precisely to allow the manager to exploit his information and increase the profit of the project.
However, the interests of the manager are not perfectly aligned with those ofthe principal. We assume that the manager derives a private non-contractible benefit from taking actions, b(a) with b'(a) > O. This implies that, all else equal, the manager prefers to take larger actions. For example, if each action a represents a possible acquisition, b(a) captures the manager's predilection for large acquisitions or "empire-building". We assume that b( 1) < R, which implies that private benefits are small relative to the cash-flows of the project, and that it is always efficient to induce the manager to take profitable actions rather than maximize private benefits. Furthermore we assume that b(O) = b(a)=O, i.e. the standard action does not yield any private benefits. The last assumption simplifies the exposition but our results are qualitatively unchanged as long as R + b(a) < e, i.e. as long as it is efficient to utilize the manager's information.
The manager is risk-neutral with respect to his monetary income, m, and his utility is given by
) If the manager privately knew his type, he would never generate zero profit. High types would always follow their signal (unless they were constrained to ta ke the standard action) a nd low types would neve r follow their signal and instead choose the standard action. Given this behavior. the choice of the standard action would revea l some of the ma nager's private information to the principal. In the extreme, the principal could grant the ma nager full disc retion. If the manager took the stand ard action, the principal would co nclude with certainty that the manager is the low type because the high type, having full di scretion. would never find it profi table to take th e sta ndard action. The assumption of private information would not qualitatively cha nge our resu lts in the static model, since the information learned in that mode l has no value to the principal (there is no co ntinuation ). It would impact the analysis of the dynamic model in two ways. First. the effect of career concerns would be limited to di sciplining th e manager not to blatantly abuse auth ority. The co ncept of negative "returns to reputation-building" would not arise beca use high ty pes are always willing to take informationally intensive ac ti ons. while low types always avoid the m. Second, the principal would have an ince ntive to grant more discre tion in the first period in order to make a more accurate infe rence from the manage r having taken the sta nda rd action (we analyze a n analogous effect in Section 4).
Unlike the manager, the principal values only the profits from the project and is risk-neutral as well. We assume that the manager is wealth constrained. The assumption approximates the (presumably fairly typical) situation whe re the cash flows of the project are large relative to the personal wealth of the manager. It rules out the possibility to implement the first best by making the risk-neutral manager residual claimant, which amounts to selling the project.
Contracts
The principal limits the manage r's opportunistic behavior by restricting the set of actions under his control. Formally, the principal chooses a compact set A , where A s:; [0, 1], and allows the manager to choose actions only from A or A u {a}, depending on whether the standard action is included in the manager's choice set. 4 We say that the manager has more authority if he has a larger set of actions from which to choose, or, formally, A gives the agent more discretion than A ' if A' c A. The assumption that the principal can ex ante limit the manager to a certain set of actions is made primarily for expositional reasons. Alternatively, we could assume that the manager always reports to the principal, who either approves or di scards his suggestion. In thi s alternative approach, a manage r effectively has more discretion -or what Aghion and Tirole (1997) call real authority -when the principal is more likely to accept his proposals. An appendix in Englmaier et al. (2010) analyzes the problem using this latter approach.
The other instrument the principal uses to limit the opportunistic behavior of the manage r is explicit monetary incentives. She offers the manager a compensation package tied to the profits of the project. While the principal can offer contracts contingent on profit, we assume that compensation cannot be made contingent on the action. In this regard, contracts are incomplete (see Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990) . We make this assumption mainly to simplify the analysis. However, there is arguably a tension in the assumption that the principal can restrict the manage r's set of actions, but cannot write compensation contracts that depend on actions. In an appendix in Englmaier et al. (2010) , we remove this assumption and allow for compensation contracts to be contingent on all obse rvable variables. The results are qualitatively similar, since it is the asymmetry of information that forces the principal to grant the manager effective control.
We denote by f3 (bonus) and (J' (salary) the payments to the manager when the profit is 1 and R, respectively. The principal never finds it optimal to offer a payment when the profit is 0, since the manager is risk-neutral. As the manager is protected by limited liability, all payments must be non-negative. Furthermore, since b(a) = 0, we can assu me without loss of generality that the standard action is always included in the choice set of the manager. In particular, if the principal does not want the manager to take the standard action, she can simply set (J' = O. Though the choice set of the manage r is formally A u (a), we henceforth abuse notation and simply refer to the set as A.
Summarizing, a contract specifies the manager's compensation and authority and has the form 1f3, (J', A). Once the terms ofthe contract have been set, the manager privately observes his signal, s, and chooses an action. The action and the state of the world determine the project's profits, which in turn, determines the managers compensation.
The optimal contract
Given a contract C = 1f3, (J', A) and a signal s, the manager's expected utility from taking action a is
(1)
Let a*(s, C) be the manager's pest response. s In addition, let I == max A be the largest action that the manager can take. If the manager chooses to maximize hi s private benefit, he will choose a = I, since b(a) is increasing in a, and his payoff is b(l). For s EA, the manager's payoff from taking the action corresponding to his signal (a = s) is given by the first line of Eq. (1 ). In particular, the manager receives the payment f3 if his information is correct, in addition to the private benefit derived from taking the action. The manager, like the principal, does not know whether or not he is informed and hence receives f3 with probability e. Finally, the manager can choose the standard action, a, for a payoff of (J'. Note that one of these three actions always weakly dominates any other action; that is, a*(s , C) E {s, a, I} .
The principal's expected payoff is e( 1 -f3) from action s, R -(J' from a, and 0 from I. The principal's expected payofffrom contract C is therefore:
(2)
The optimal choice ofCmaximizes V(C, e). The following lemma provides a partial characterization of the optimal contract. 4 Compactness is necessary to ensure existence of the maximum in the manager's choi ce program. S In particular. a' (s , C) E arg max. , AEluIS, (I. Without loss of genera lity. we assume that a' (s. C) is a pure strategy. Ro ugh ly speaking. mixed strategies can be ruled out since the principal always has a preferred action she would like the manager to take. Therefore. if the manager's res ponse involves mixing across actions, the principal respo nd s by slig htly adjusting the compe nsation payments. I] and a* = a otllerwise) ; and (iii) gives tile principal at least as mucll utility as C.
Proof. The proof of this lemma and all other proofs are collected in Appendix A. 0 Lemma 1 allows us to restrict the search for the optimal A to intervals. Also, we need only consider contracts in which the manager takes the action corresponding to his signal when he has the authority to do so and the standard action when he lacks authority. To the extent that it is costly to induce the manager to behave that way (as we will shortly see ), the optimal contract does not generally give the manager full discretion. In order to simplify the analysis of optimal intervals [k, I], we assume throughout the rest of the paper that the marginal private benefit of action a normalized by the likelihood of that action being optimal is strictly increasing.
The function v(a) can be considered a measure of the severity of conflict of interests. Intuitively, when there is little likelihood that the optimal action is in the neighborhood of a, but there is an opportunity to extract greater private benefit, the conflict of interests is severe at a.lmagine, for example, that the principal must decide whether to increase the manager's budget by $1 ° million, which would allow the manager to invest in a new technology whose cost exceeds his current budget.
Also imagine that the manager would derive an incremental private benefit of$l million from the investment. The propensity of the manager to lobby for the budget increase is the same irrespective of the likelihood that the investment in the new technology is optimal. However, the likelihood of the optimality of the technology determines the principal's attitude towards the manager's lobbying efforts.lfthe probability that the new technology is optimal is 1 percent, the principal will be rather opposed to the manager's request; if the probability is 60 percent, he will be more willing to consider it. In this sense, the conflict of interest between the principal and the manager is more severe in the former case than the latter. 6 Under Assumption 1, the optimal choice of A places an upper bound on the actions that the manager can take (e.g., places limits on the size of investments), while allowing complete discretion below that bound. The following proposition formalizes this intuition.
Proposition 1. Tile optimal interval of discretion Ilas tile form[O, I].
Proposition 1 reduces the choice of A to a univariate problem. [n particular, the degree of discretion granted to the manager can be identified with I. Managers with a higher limit have greater freedom to choose the course of action.
The incentive compatibility conditions associated with any contract satisfying Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 are
where Eq. (3) ensures that the manager always prefers the standard action over the action that maximizes his private benefit, while Eq. (4) ensures that the manager takes the action corresponding to his signal whenever possible. Note that if condition (4) holds at a = 0, then the inequality holds for all a and that, for a contract to be optimal, the incentive compatibility conditions must bind at a = 0. Therefore, Eqs. (3) and (4) reduce to
which provides a simple relationship between {3, (J, and I, and establishes that the manager's compensation package is increasing in the level of discretion, i.e. managers with extensive control over a project must be compensated generously in order not to abuse their discretion. These results are summarized in the next corollary. 
Tile allocation of au til ority
Given Corollary 1, the principal's problem reduces from selecting the triple {{3, (J , Al to selecting the best contract of the
In and the managers best response, a*(s), 6 Another interpretation of v(a) is the minimum value the manage r must be able to gene rate to make the principal willing to give the manager more discretion in the neighborhood of a. To see this. suppose that the principal must decide whether to give the manager more discretion, by extending A from Ik.ll to Ik.l+ EJ. The benefit to expanding the di scretion of the manager is the increased probability that the optimal action is taken. times the value that the optimal action generates: FII . The cost of expanding discretion comes from the the fact that, if the manager chooses to behave opportunistically, he can increase his private benefit by btl + E) -btl) '" D.b. The principal can induce the manager not to abuse his discretion and still benefit only if D.Fv ~ D.b. Dividing by E and taking the limit as E goes to zero, the equation becomes.
into the principal's profit function (Eq. (2)) yields the following maximization problem 7 :
The profit function reflects the fact that the principal can always earn at least R; and by gi ving the manager a leve l of discretion I and a compensation package with an expected value of b(l), the principal can earn an additional profit of e -R with probability F(/). We restrict attention to interior optima. The existence of an interior optimum is ensured if the conflict of interests in the neighborhood of zero is not too severe and the conflict of interests in the neighborhood of one is severe. s
The first-order condition is
or equivalently
-R=v(I).
( 7) The marginal benefit of increasing the manager's discretion is the expected value of the manager' s information, 8 -R, times the increased likelihood, j(/), that the manager will be able to utilize his information. The marginal cost of greater discretion is b'(I), which reflects the higher expected compensation required to induce the manager to take the correct action. Eq uivalently, at the optimal level of discretion, the value of the manager's information must equal the minimum value, v(l), required to resolve the conflict of interests at the margin. Hence, the optimal degree of discretion is determined by trading off the benefits of decentralized deci sion-making agai nst the costs created by conflicts of interes t. The next proposition establishes that there is a unique level of discretion which maximizes the principal's profit, and summarizes how discretion varies with the parameters of the model.
The optimal level of discretion is unique and is given by the solution to Eq. (7) . In addition, the optimal level of discretion increases in the potential benefit from better decision making, 1 -R, increases in reputation, 8, and decreases in the severity of the conflict of interests, v.
Proposition 2 is consistent with casual observation. Activities which are not easily standardized and which are information intensive, warrant greater delegation of control. In add ition, management positions involving a high degree of discretion are filled by individuals with high perceived ability (high 8) and offer generous incentive compensation.
The dynamic model
We now extend our analysis to a dynamic setting in which the manager's current choices influence his future reputation. We do so by a simple repetition of the static model over two periods. In this section, we assume that the relationship between the principal and the manager lasts for only one period and in the second period the manager forms a relationship with a new employer. In Section 4, we consider the case in which the principal may have an extended relationship with t he manager. The assumption, that the length of the relation is exogenously fixed to one period is for example sensible in environments in which deals are made on a project by project basis. In that case, as for example argued in Holmstrom (1999) , implicit incentives are provided by the la bor (or capital) ma rket, which uses the manager's past performance as the basis for determining his level of compensation and authority in subsequent re lationships. The notation for a ll variables is the same, except a time subscript is added to indicate the period. The manager m aximizes the expectation of the discounted sum of the single-period utilities, U= Ul + 15u2, where 8 is the discount factor and Uj is the manager's payoff in time period i.
The first-period equilibrium
As in the static model , the principal and the manager e nter the first period with a common belief 8 that the manager is informed. The market then observes the manager's choice of al and the resulting profit iT l and updates its belief to 8(al, iTl) ' In the second period, the manager enters into a new contract with a new principal. In the analysis that follows, we de rive a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. We require that (i) the second-period contract and the manager's best response must be optimal given 8(a l , iTl); (ii) the first-period contract and the manager's best response must be optimal given the second-period strategies; and (iii) beliefs &( al , iTl) must be consistent with Bayes rule wheneve r possible.
Using backward induction, the optimal contract in the second period is equal to the optimal contract derived in the analysis ofthe static model. Specifically, the second-period contract is
where 1 2 (8) solves Eq. (6) and is the optimal level of discretion for a manager with reputation e. Again, the manager's best response in the second period is to take the action corresponding to his signal when possible and take the stand a rd action otherwise. Slightly abusing notation, let U2(e ) be the manager's expected utility from such a contract in the second period. Substituting the manager's best response into Eq. (1), we have that
The payoff is increasing in e, so the manager unambiguously prefers to be perceived as a more informed type. Moreover, U2(0) = 0, so that the manager receives no compensation when he is believed to be the low type with certainty.
The followin g proposition characterizes the first-period contract and the manager's best response. As in the static model, the manager takes the action corresponding to his signal on an interval and the standard action otherwise. Th e market beliefs associated with this equilibrium are compelling: managers who utilize their information are inferred as low types if they earn low profits and high types if they earn hi gh profits, and the inference is unchanged when managers earn the intermediate level of profit, R. Moreover, the optimal incentive payments satisfy:
Notice that the incentive payments f31 and al are functions ofu2(e) and u2(1), the manager's second-period payoff when his reputation is Band 1, respectively. As before, explicit incentives are necessary to induce the manager to use his authority productively. However, in choosing an action in the first period, the manager must consider the impact of that action on his future compensation.
The equilibrium in Proposition 3 is not the unique equilibrium ofthe game. It can be shown, however, that the game has two classes of equilibria. The first class includes a continuum of equilibria in which the manager always takes the standard action.
9 We consider such equilibria economically uninteresting. lO The second class includes equilibria in which the manager takes some actions from [0, 1] with a positive probability. In these equilibria, all three profit levels are observed and beliefs are thus fully derived using Bayes law. It can be further shown that the equilibrium in Proposition 3 is the unique equilibrium in the second c1ass. ll
Career concerns and explicit incentives
When the equilibrium incentive payments, f31 and a I , are positive, Eqs. (9) and (10) reduce to :
If the manager seeks to maximize his private benefit, he receives b(ll)' In the static model (and thus in the second period of the dynamic model), the incentive payment a 2 for a manager who is given discretion 11 must equal b(ll) to discourage the manager from pursuing pure private benefits . In the first period, if the manager uses his discretion rather than takes the standard action, his performance will be poor, and the market will infer that he is not a capable manager. The manager will consequently lose DU2(e) in future compensation, in addition to losing any current incentive compensation. Hence, the manager is more hesitant to knowingly abuse his discretion if his reputation is at stake. The principal takes the career concerns into account and lowers the explicit incentive payment so that al = b(ll) -DU 2(&)' An immediate implication of Eq. (11) is that al :0 a 2, holding fixed the level of discretion I and the reputation of the manager.
However, the effect of career concerns on the manager's willingness to utilize his private information is more subtle. While in the static setting efi = a, Eq. (12) implies that ef31 does not generally equal al . Career concerns change the relative 9 These equil ibria are supported by off-equilibrium path beliefs that "punish" successful managers. For exa mple. (1) the principal in the first pe riod offe rs an e psilon inte rval of discre tion a nd zero mone tary incentives. (2) the ma nage r in the first period always ta kes the standard action, (3 ) the ma rket beliefs are e(O) = o. erR) = ii, and e(l) = o. (4 ) the contract offered a nd the ma nager's be havior in the second period a re as de rived in the sta tic model. 10 We conjecture that if the conce pt of seque ntial equilibrium, Kre ps and Wil son (1982) . was generalized to games with a continuu m of actions. these "degenerate" equilibria would not be seque ntial equilibria .
11 A more formal treatme nt of thi s a rgumen t is given in a n a ppe ndix in Englmaier e t al. If the return to reputation-building is positive, career concerns make the manager more inclined to utilize his private information since doing so reveals his type and yields high expected reputational returns. In this case, the principal can lower the incentive payment for information-intensive actions relative to the standard action, implying that tJlh s al. When the return to reputation-building is negative, the manager requires more generous compensation to take "revealing" actions, and we have that 8(31 > al . We summarize the preceding discussion with the following corollary to Proposition 3 . Corollary 2 and Lemma 2 together imply that if increases in the manager's reputation have increasing marginal benefits, then the manager has a strong incentive to distinguish himself as a capable decision-maker. u2(8) is convex if discretion increases rapidly as the manager's reputation improves, and if the increase in discretion is accompanied by large increases in both explicit compensation and private benefits, as is the case when b( . ) is convex. To get some sense of when u2(8) is convex, recall that v(,) is a measure of the severity of the conflict of interests. v is strictly increasing, allowing us to rewrite
Eq. (7) as 1 2 (8) = V-I (8 -R). A direct implication of the preceding equation is that 1 2 (8) is convex if and only if v(.) is concave.

Intuitively, discretion increases rapidly as the manager's reputation improves only if the conflict of interests does not worsen too rapidly as the manager gains greater control. A sufficient (though not necessary) condition for the convexity of u2(8) is that 1 2 (8) and F( . ) be convex. The fact that v(.) = b'(· )If( ·) is increasing and F( . ) is convex, implies that b( . ) is convex as well.
Intuitively, if discretion and private benefits are convex in the manager's reputation, then u2(8) is convex as well. An example for such a situation arises when "stars" in the market are rewarded disproportionately relative to managers with average reputations. Conversely, if u2(8) is concave, the market disproportionately punishes weak performers, and managers have an incentive to take conservative actions in order to avoid placing their reputational capital at risk.
Career concerns and the allocation of authority
Substituting the manager's best response, aj, given in Proposition 3, into the profit function (2) results in the first-period maximization problem for the principal:
The profit function is similar to that in the previous section (Eq. (6)). One important difference is the additional term, ((J(31 -al )F(ll). As discussed above, 8(31 -al represents the cost of implementing information-intensive actions relative to the standard action, while F(ll) is the probability that the manager takes such an action. As this cost increases, the marginal benefit of granting discretion decreases.
From Corollary 2, we know that the relative cost of implementing information-intensive actions depends on the return to reputation-building. Let 11 (8) be the optimal level of discretion in the first period, and recall that 12(8) is the optimal level in the second period (and equa ls the optimal level of discretion in the static model). We have the following proposition.
Proposition 4. If the return to reputation-building is positive, then for any level of reputation8, the manager receives a higher level of discretion in the first period relative to the second period, i.e.,/ l (8) :::: 12(8). If the return is negative, then there exists a valueo* :::: 1/2, such that if the discount factor iso S 0*, then the level of discretion is lower in the first period, i.e., / l (8) S 1 2 (8).
When the return to reputation-building is positive, it is cheaper for the principal to induce the manager to use his discretion productively, and the principal grants the manager greater authority. Conversely, when the return to reputationbuilding is negative, the explicit incentives necessary to make the manager use his discretion productively become relatively more costly (although the absolute cost of incentives may go down). The principal responds by reducing the manager's authority.
However, when the discount factor is sufficiently hi gh, there may be cases in which the optimal level of dis c retion is higher, although the returns to reputation building are negative. Notice from Eq. (9) , that the incentive payment for the standard action, 0"1, is zero when b(ll) < 8U 2(1:I) (since incentive payments cannot be negative ). It is optimal for the principal to increase II as long as 0"1 = 0,13 Therefore, if the level of di scretion at which 0"1 becomes positive is sufficiently large, then II (&) :=:: 1 2 (e) regardless of the returns to reputation-building. Intuitively, it is possible that the positive career concerns (the lower absolute cost of implementing the standard action) outweigh the negative caree r concerns (the hi gher relative cost of implementing information-intensive actions ).1 4
Differentiating VI (II) makes the relationship between authority and the returns to reputation-building particularly clear. Assuming that the incentive payments are strictly positive and substituting Eqs. (11) and (12) for 0"1 and e f3l, we obtain the following first order condition: (14) Eq. (14) is the dynamic analogue to Eq. (7). At the optimal level of discretion, the expected value of the manager's information equals exactly the value required to compensate the principal for the marginal cost of incentives; thi s value is V(ll) adjusted for the returns to reputation-building.
The key result in this section is that while implicit incentives discourage purely opportunistic behavior, it may actually become more costly to encourage the manager to take actions that are ri sky -in the sense that the returns depend on the quality of the manager's information -relative to the cost of inducing managers to take a conservative action. This situation arises if the expected returns to building a reputation are lower than the benefits of simply preserving a given reputation. Specifically, if expected future compensation of the manager is concave in his reputation, the manager has an incentive to behave conservatively. The principal optimally responds to such conservatism by limiting the di scretion of the manage r relative to the static model. On the other hand, if the returns to building a reputation are large, the manager has a strong incentive to use his discre tion productively and is allocated greater authority.
Repeated interaction
The success or failure of a project is revealing about a deci sion -maker's ability only in proportion to the scope of his or her authority. For instance, the performance of a division indicates little about the decision-making capability of the divi sion manager if he is simply carrying out the orders of the headquarters. In the previous section, if the principal grants the manager a first-period level of discretion, II, then with probability F(ll) the manager's type is revealed to the market. Thus, future lenders or employers are better able to assess the ability of managers who are given greater discretion in past relationships. However, the informational benefits of discretion are ignored by current lenders and employers if they do not anticipate future interactions with the manager. The analysis in this section shows that when the relationship extends over multiple periods, the principal internalizes the informational exte rnality present early in the relationship, and increases discretion relative to a short-term relationship.
We proceed by extending our analysi s to the natural case where the relationship may span both periods, but assume that the principal can only commit to single-period contracts. I S If the manager is reveal ed to be uninformed at the end of the first period (8 = 0), the principal rationally chooses to hire a new manager, whose reputation is given by e. The notation for all variables is the same as in the previous section, except a superscript R is added to indicate repeated interaction.
Absent commitment, the second-period contract mu st maximize the principal's second-period profit and is therefore { b(I~( e )) 18, b(I~( e)) , [0, 1~( 8 ) ]} , where 8 equals either the updated reputation of the existing manager or equals 1:1 when the principal hi res a new manager. This contract yields the principal an expected utility of V(I~( e )), as given by Eq. (6) and is the principal's expected utility in the static model. Simplifying notation, we define V2(e) == V(I~ ( 8)). The principal's minimum level of utility in the second period is V2(1:I) since she can always hire a manager with reputation 1:1.
Proposition 3 applies here as well, implying that the optimal first period contract is of the form { f3~, O"f, [0 , I~l} and the first-period incentive payments are given by Eqs. (9) and (10). The equilibrium incentive payments induce the manager to act on his information whenever he receives a signal SI E [0, I~ I and take the standard action otherwise. The manager receives 13 To be precise, it is optimal to do so unless () -R+ fJ{3 , < O. in which case the valu e of the ma nager's information is lowe r tha n the cost of inducing the ma nage r to utili ze it (see Eq. (13)). In this case, the o ptimal level of discretion is ze ro.
' 4 The condition o n '\ in the second pa rt of Propositi on 4 ensures tha tthe corne r. w here b(/ ,) = '\ U2({)) is less tha n/2(O). so that the relative cost of incentives determines the level of discretio n. The incentive payme nt, a " refl ects the fact that if the ma nager a buses hi s disc retion. he suffe rs a co mpl ete loss of his reputational ca pital. If there is some noise in the profit function. the seve rity of the ma rket's punishm e nt for poor performa nce decreases. lowering the cost of pursuing priva te benefi ts a nd increasing a,. In thi s scenario. it can be shown that condi tions on the discount fac tor are not necessary to obtain th e result in Proposition 4.
's In Englmaie r et a l. (2010 ) we a nalyze long-term contracts. We show tha t whe n th e princi pal can commi t to lo ng-te rm contracts. she co unte rs the conservative bias of managers by raising the future utility of success ful ma nagers, U2( I ), by rewa rding them wi th grea ter authority and incentive payments tha n would prevail in the marke t otherwi se. Offe ring greater com pe nsation in the seco nd pe ri od has no fi rst orde r impact on the princi pal's second -pe riod profit. How eve r, in creasing the ma nager's second pe riod utility, U2(1) , has a first order impac t on the princi pal's profit in the first pe riod because it lowers the ince ntive payme nts necessa ry to induce informatio n-inte nsive actio ns. such a signal with probability F(I~) and with probability e turns out to be the high type. In this case, the principal rehires the manager and receives V 2 (1) -V 2 (e) of additional utility over the baseline level of V2(e).
Let n(l~) be the sum of the principal's first and second-period expected payoffs when she offers the manager a first-period
, where V1 (I~) is the principal's first-period expected utility as given by Eq.
(13). Given our analysis of the second period hiring decisions, the principal chooses the first-period level of discretion to maximize:
The last term in the preceding equation, 8e[V2(1) -V2(e)]F(I~), captures the informational benefit of giving the manager discretion early in the relationship. The greater the first-period level of discretion,l~, the greater the likelihood that the principallearns about the manager's ability and makes the optimal hiring decision in the second period. Beyond this additional effect, the principal faces the identical tradeoffs as in the previous section as 8V 2 (e) does not depend on the first-period discretion, and thus has no impact on the level of discretion. It immediately follows that the optimal level of discretion must be weakly greater than in a short-term relationship. Let 1~(8) be the optimal level of discretion in the first period and (fJ~(e), ()f(e)) be the associated compensation package. Recall that 1 1 (e) is the optimal first-period discretion when only short-term relationships are possible, and let (fJ1 (e), ()1 (e)) denote the optimal incentives for this case. We have established the following proposition.
Proposition 5, If the horizon of the relationship is extended, then the optimal level of discretion and the corresponding incentive payments increase. Equivalently,I~(e) ::: 11 (e), fJ~(e) ::: fJ1 (e), anda-~(e) ::: ()1 (e) .
Whereas in a short-lived relationship the informational benefit of discretion accrues to the future employers and lenders and is ignored by the principal. the principal internalizes this benefit and chooses a higher level of discretion in a longterm relationship. Throughout we have assumed that e > R. However, the informational benefit of discretion may cause the principal to delegate some control even if e < R. That is, even if the manager's reputation is so low that the net expected surplus generated from his decisions is negative in a static setting, the principal may give the manager decision-making rights as a way of screening for informed managers.
5, Related literature and empirical research
The static trade-off between information and control has been discussed extensively in the literature. The delegation problem was initially analyzed by Holmstrom (1984) while Jensen and Meckling (1992) focussed on strategies how organizations resolve the associated problems. Harris and Raviv (1996) model the capital budgeting process of firms and show that when division managers are more informed about the productivity of capital and have a preference for large investments, the optimal mechanism involves spending limits. Several papers have explored the complementarity between incentives and control. Prendergast (2002) shows that managers receive both greater discretion and stronger incentives in environments characterized by complexity and uncertainty due to their information advantage in such environments. Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) also establish the complementarity between incentives and control, although for reasons unrelated to any information advantage of managers. In their model, workers given greater freedom to allocate time to personal activities must also receive stronger incentives to behave productively in work-related activities. Aghion and Bolton (1992) consider a problem where investors not only give the entrepreneur monetary incentives, but also retain control rights. The inability to write complete contracts and the fact that neither party has the incentive to take the action that maximizes social surplus in all circumstances, makes it efficient to vary control rights across contingencies. In our model, while the principal always has the incentive to choose the first-best action, the agent has an informational advantage. Control considerations arise due to the information asymmetry and not the incompleteness of contracts (though limiting the set of feasible contracts aggravates the problem).
A more recent and related treatment is Alonso and Matouschek (2008), though they assume that the principal is unable to commit to contingent transfers. They show that the contracting problem of a principal who faces an informed but biased agent reduces to a delegation problem in which the principal commits to a set of decisions from which the agent chooses his preferred one. Krishna and Morgan (2008) study optimal contracting in a model with an uninformed principal and an informed agent where the principal can commit to a payment scheme but retains ultimate decision-making authority. They show that the optimal contract never induces the agent to fully reveal his information. Similar to our analysis, both in Alonso and Matouschek (2008) and Krishna and Morgan (2008) the results depend on the degree of conflict of interests between the principal and the agent.
Most papers on delegation use a similar setup: (1) an organization consisting of a principal and an agent must make a decision, (2) the agent has private information relevant for ajointly optimal decision, and (3) the principal's and agent's individual preferences over decisions diverge. The contracting assumptions with respect to decision and transfer rules, however, vary considerably. In one extreme, Crawford and Sobel (1982) assume that the principal cannot commit to any decision or transfer rule. In the other extreme, Krishna and Morgan (2008) assume that the principal can write fully contingent decision and compensation contracts. The rest of the literature falls between these two extremes. Dessein (2002) is close to Crawford and Sobel in that it also prohibits both transfer and decision rules but allows the complete set of decision rights to be assigned to the principal or the agent. Holmstrom (1984) and Alonso and Matouschek (2008) allow for decision rules but prohibit transfer rules. Our paper can be viewed as somewhat orthogonal to those two papers: we allow transfer rules but prohibit decision rules. We say "somewhat orthogonal" because while the agent cannot commit to take a specific action in response to his information, the principal can commit to withhold a set of actions from the agent. In this respect, our decision rights assignment is similar to Dessein (2002) , except it is continuous.
Our result on the dynamic aspect of granting authority to a manager, namely that it may be profitable to grant "excessive" authority to an agent early on in a relation, has been discussed in the literature, though in the context of eliciting information on whether or not the agent is "trustworthy" and without considering a role for explicit monetary incentives. Aghion et al. (2004) introduce the notion of transferable control, defined as a situation where the principal can transfer control to the agent but cannot commit herself to do so and use this notion to study the extent to which control transfers allow an agent to reveal information regarding his willingness to cooperate with the principal in the future. They show that, when control is transferable but not contractible, it can be optimal to transfer control unconditionally and learn instead from the way in which the agent exercises control. Boot et al. (1993) explain the use of legally unenforceable, discretionary financial contracts in circumstances where legally enforceable contracts are feasible and argue that discretionary contracts foster the development of reputation. Finally, Ichino and Muehlheusser (2008) provide a result very similar to ours with regard to the monitoring decisions of a printipal. They show that a principal may refrain from monitoring early in a relationship to test whether an agent is the type that exploits the possibility to misbehave. Kaarb0e and Olsen (2006) analyze how the strength of explicit incentives evolves over time, though in a context unrelated to a manager's use of information and managerial conservatism. Like our paper, they establish that career concerns may result in stronger explicit incentives early in a manager's career. However, Kaarb0e and Olsen (2006) argue in a multitasking framework that career concerns may' provide incentives to engage only in some tasks, making it necessary to provide counterbalancing explicit incentives for other tasks.
Several papers have studied how career concerns affect both managerial behavior and job design . While Fama (1980) argues that the labor market plays an important role in disciplining managers, Holmstrom (1999) and Holmstrom and Ricart i Costa (1986) show that while this is correct in some circumstances, career concerns can actually aggravate conflicts of interests. Similar to our study, they show that career concerns may make it harder to motivate risk taking as managers may underinvest in risky, but profitable, projects to preserve their reputational capital. In a related vein, Scharfstein and Stein (1990) and Zwiebel (1995) show that managers have an incentive to mimic other managers, ignoring substantive private information, in order to avoid "standing out" and to protect their reputations. Ely et al. (2003) even show that an agent's desire to preserve his reputation can in fact lead to the loss of the entire surplus in a transaction.
Several studies provide empirical support for our results. Magnan and St-Onge (1997) study executive compensation in the commercial banking industry and find a statistically significant correlation between measures of managerial discretion and the sensitivity of compensation to performance. A more recent analysis of the same industry by Nagar (2002) shows that high growth and innovative banks grant their branch managers greater authority and stronger incentives relative to their peers at stable banks. This suggests that branch managers receive greater authority and incentives when their tasks are more information intensive. Finally, it is natural to expect that stricter controls are placed on managers in situations where there is a wide divergence of interests. In the context of corporate governance, the severity of the conflict of interests, v, is in part determined by the quality of institutions which protect investor rights, lowering the returns to self-dealing by dominant shareholders and managers. In this vein, La Porta et al. (1997) and argue that in countries with weaker protections, there is a bias away from forms of finance which result in the separation of ownership and control. Chevalier and Ellison (1999) show that termination probabilities for young mutual fund managers increase steeply with underperformance, but are fairly insensitive to overperformance. In the language of our analysis, there is a negative return to reputation-building. Consistent with the incentives to avoid "standing out", the authors find that young managers hold more conventional portfolios. Regarding the use of incentives, Dass et al. (2008) establish an empirical relation between stronger contractual incentives and a reduction in herd behavior among fund managers. Finally, Gibbons and Murphy (1992) and Kahn and Sherer (1990) study the relation between implicit and explicit incentives as tenure increases. Gibbons and Murphy (1992) find cross-sectional evidence for their above mentioned result, that chief executives receive stronger explicit incentives as they approach retirement age whereas Kahn and Sherer (1990) analyze longitudinal data from a single firm and find, in line with our predictions, that bonus payments of high-level managers are actually less sensitive to performance as tenure increases. However, both Gibbons and Murphy (1992) and Kahn and Sherer (1990) measure the average sensitivity of pay to performance, whereas our theory suggests that the sensitivity of pay to performance varies with the level of performance. The average sensitivity of pay is a function of both the incentive payments for moderate, (J, and excellent performance, fJ. Since (T always increases with tenure, the average sensitivity of pay to performance decreases with tenure only if fJ decreases with tenure -which happens only if there are negative returns to reputation-building. This suggests that in the sample of Kahn and Sherer, high-level managers with low seniority must be given strong monetary incentives to counter implicit incentives to "play it safe". On the other hand, our analysis suggests that in Gibbons and Murphy's sample of CEO's, the rising average sensitivity of pay to performance with tenure is largely due to changes in (T. This would indicate that the prevention of blatant abuse of authority is a first-order consideration in the design of compensation for the executives studied by Gibbons and Murphy.
Conclusion
In this paper. we analyze the design of compensation schemes and the allocation of authority in a dynamic principalagent framework. We show that a manager's discretion is increasing in the value of his information and in the quality of his reputation. and decreasing in the severity of the conflict of interests. Moreover. managers given greater discretion must receive larger monetary incentives to align the ir interests with those of the principal. Our analysis implies that talented decision-makers are given extensive control rights and receive generous incentive compensation.
With this intuitive interrelationship between information. authority. and incentives as a baseline. we explo re the role of career concerns. Career concerns lower the cost of explicit incentives necessary to discourage clear forms of opportunism. since managers have an incentive to preserve their reputation. However. in an effort to avoid negative inferences about their ability. managers may make overly conservative decisions. neglecting their own information. Implicit incentives may thus increase the expli cit incentives necessary to induce risk-taking. In such a scenario. the principal reduces managerial discretion to economize on the increased cost of incentives.
These results link our model to theories of managerial conservatism in which career concerns cause managers to undertake less innovative projects. despite their knowledge that such investments are inferior. We show that a principal optimally preempts such behavior by both strengthening incentives and limiting managerial authority. The costs of managerial conservatism thus include not only those cases in which decision-makers choose to ignore valuable information. but also those cases in which decision-makers are forced to ignore information as a result of the centralization of decision-making.
The allocation of control changes as the horizon of the relationship changes. Since it is easier to infer the ability of managers if they have more authority. discretion serves as a screening device. When the principal expects to engage in a long-term relationship with a manager. she internalizes this informational benefit and gives the manager greater authority. 
A.2. Proof of Proposition 1
Note that (1 -(3)(J ?: R -a; otherwise. the principal could increase her profit by reducing the discretion of the manager. violating the optimality of the contract.
Choose z such that 
A.3. Proof of Proposition 2
Recall that v is assumed to be strictly increasing. This is sufficient to ensure that the second order conditions are satisfied and that v(0) < (e -R) < v(1 ).1 6 In this case there is a unique 1* such that 8 -R = v(l * ). Since V is strictly increasing for 1< 1* and decreasing for I > 1*. 1* is the unique maximum.
establishing the first statement of the Proposition. Finally. it is easily verified that 1* is increasing in e. and decreasing in R and v. 0
A.4. Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose that the principal offers the manager a first-period contract C = (fJ1 , a1, A 1 ) and that the markets beliefs in the second period are 8(a1 , IT1)' In addition. recall that the manager's equilibrium payoff in the second period is u2 (&(a1 , ITI ) ). The manager's expected utility from taking action a1 in the first period. conditional on observing signal S1. is
We first show that for any contract. C. there is an equilibrium in the continuation game such that the manager's best response to C is always to choose one of two actions: the action corresponding to his information and either the standard action or the action that maximizes private benefits.
If a1 
Given these beliefs. it follows from the payoff function (15) and the definition of.A that aj is indeed a best response for the manager. Conversely. we can show that e is consistent with Bayes rule whenever applicable. Given aj . any action a1 E.A is taken if and only if 51 = a1 . It follows that conditional on observing the manager take any such action. updated beliefs are 8 = IT1. IT1 E {O. 1}. since high types generate a profit of1 with a probability of 1 and low types generate a profit of 0 with a probability of 1. No action a1 E A1 -.A is ever taken. hence the conditional probability can be arbitrarily set as 8(a1 , IT1) = IT1. IT 1 E {O. 1} as well. Finally, since the probability that the manager takes action a is independent of his type and since the profit generated from a is independent of his type as well. the inference when al = a remains unchanged. That is, 8(0 , R) = e.
16 1f((1 -R) ~ 11(0) then V is strictly decrea sing over the entire interval 10. 11. and /' = It follows that (a j, &) is an equilibrium of the continuation game. given C. We can now analyze the principal's optimal choice of C in light of this equilibrium. Given our assumption that b( 1) < R. the principal always prefers to induce the manager to take the standard action rather than the action that maximizes his private benefit. Therefore. IT I is chosen to satisfy. otherwise.
The payoff from taking any given action differs by at most a constant from his payoffs in the static setting (Eq.
( 1 ) 
In addition to these conditions. the optimal contract must satisfy the following nonnegativity conditions: al ::': 0 and fJl ::': O. At the optimum. either Eq. (1)). O}. and note that -max (z)=min( -z) for any function z. We can write ITI -8fJl = ITI + min {8(eu2(1) -u2(8)) -ITI. O} = min {8(eu2(1) -u2(8) ) . ) is independent of 11 and ITI is weakly increasing in 11 ' ITI is non-negative. and ifreputation-buildinghas positive expected return. 8(8u2(1) -u2(8 ) ) is non-negative as well. Therefore. (ITI -efJ l ) where g ( . ) is a weakly increasing function. it must be the case that the level of discretion that maximizes VI is greater than the level of discretion that maximizes V 2 . Equivalently. 11 (8) ::,: 1 2 (e ).
Assume the expected return to reputation-building is negative. Then. using the expression derived above. (ITI -8fJl ) = 8(f:Ju2(1) -U2(e)). which is negative and independent of 11' It follows that (ITI -f:JfJl )F(ll) is a weakly decreasing function of 11. Define la to be the value of 11 at which ITI starts taking positive values. That is. b(la ) = 8u2(e). On the interval [/a. ((;/) ). Therefore. it must be that 1 2 ((;/) > la. This fact together with the fact that VI (11) = V2(11) + d(ll) for 11 ::': la implies that 11 ((;/) ~ 12(8) . 0
b(ll) -ITI = min {8 u2(&). b(ll)} = 8u2(8). which is constant in
